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Introduction
Market-based economies face the continual problem of balancing the benefits created by free mar-
kets with the need to protect individuals, and minimise the misuse of economic power. Competition
policy and the network of regulations designed to balance competing interests regularly need to shift
position as new market opportunities, consumer expectations and social norms change. After the
golden age of the post-war boom, and for the last two decades of the twentieth century, there
emerged an international trend towards criminalising serious cartel conduct. In the 1980s, revolu-
tions in communication and computing technologies facilitated new products and services and
saw the emergence of new markets dominated, in some cases by powerful monopolistic and oligo-
polistic structures. Today, additional ‘disruptive’ industries continue to emerge as technologies and
forms of work change, further unbalancing the previous equilibrium between market opportunity
and consumer sovereignty. These recent transformations have proved a challenge to national and
international policy makers, whose regulations are sometimes 50 years behind the transformations
wrought by rapid technological and social change. For example, current antitrust legislation in the
US seems unable to promote competitive markets and consumer sovereignty in the face of giant
firms which are exploiting new capabilities in rapidly emerging industries (for recent works, see Phi-
lippon, 2019; Stoller, 2019).
Historical analysis – a broader perspective
By contrast, history is replete with examples of periods of rapid change and how governments
restored a balance between the new forms of market power and the individuals and communities
impacted by these. The revolutionary changes in manufacturing processes in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century, and the transportation revolutions of the nineteenth century were fol-
lowed by legislation designed to regulate market excess and protect workers from exploitation. The
new markets created by, industrially produced food, consumer goods, oil production and electricity
were accompanied by regulatory changes to constrain emergent monopolies and cartels and to pro-
tect consumers and competitors. These historical events also provide examples from which to learn.1
How did previously unconstrained markets cause unintended problems? How did some monopolies
and cartels manipulate not just their own markets, but those of others? How did they shape policies,
influence development and impact on the economic and social environment in which they operated?
How did firms’ behaviour change over time and what new strategies did they use when large
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transformations occurred? How did governments and firms reach a new equilibrium in balancing the
interests of the cartel and the interests of the citizen? The papers in this issue provide case studies of
several of these interactions in the twentieth century.
The paradox of a global convergence towards criminalising serious cartel conduct, and the emer-
gence of new monopolies and anti-competitive associations in new sectors has been accompanied
by a revival in historical research on cartels and competition policy during the last decade (Barjot &
Schröter, 2013; Bertilorenzi, 2016; Christophers, 2016; Phillips Sawyer, 2018; Tworek, 2019). Today,
there is increasing awareness that the history of anti-competitive regulation follows different pathways
in different countries and there is no endpoint to this process (Fellman & Shanahan, 2016; 2018). Com-
petition policy is heavily embedded in the local institutional, legal and political context, while its out-
comes and effectiveness are a result of its interconnectedness with other legislation. Individual cartels
and firms adapt to changes in the regulatory environment, to political decisions, and internal and exter-
nal pressures. Firms are not only reactive but also proactive. Strong cartels have been able to influence
both domestic and international policies – a factor which was increasingly recognised in the interwar
period and led to the first international attempts to monitor and regulate their activities. Powerful car-
tels were also present in key industries and considered important by many governments as necessary to
help generate economic progress. As a result, national policies often tolerated both extensive collabor-
ation and allowed some industries’ exemptions from overall bans. In practice, firms and industries both
tried to influence legislation and policy and were influenced by it. Analogous patterns of market devel-
opment and regulatory response are evident again today, although recently the balance appears to have
shifted away from consumers and towards greater market freedom for technological firms.
Although historically oriented competition policy and cartel research has seen a revival, historical
studies of the dynamics and interplay between, on the one hand, firms and cartels and political
decision-makers and government authorities on the other, are still scarce. One goal of the research
presented here is to add to this field and address questions concerning the connections between the
legal/regulatory environment and company and/or cartel behaviour.
Cartels also have reach beyond the boundaries of a single nation. Either through individual influ-
ence or in broader international networks, cartels can influence markets, prices, trade and inter-
national regulations, and more broadly, diplomatic and political relations. Despite this they are
frequently overlooked. Indeed, in many accounts of long run trade, international cartels are barely
mentioned (Findlay & O’Rourke, 2007; O’Rourke & Williamson, 2000).
Both internal and external factors may be important to explain cartel formation. For example,
technological change, and first mover advantage, such as standard setting, were important for the
emergence of some cartels. While these links are under-researched, so too is the role of finance
and cartels’ connections with banks, something observers in the interwar period had already
noted (Mond, 1927; Notz,1919).
Historically, cartels have emerged via a number of different routes. Some (such as the Scandina-
vian cartels, which appeared in the interwar period) began in regions with similar products or exist-
ing business networks, while others (such as some mineral cartels) were linked by the location of ore
bodies, or political regimes (such as the British empire). While some international cartels were an
outgrowth of national cartels, others became international cartels by the break-up of empires (see
for example, Liefmann, 1927). This, however, is a topic that should be investigated in more detail.
Cartels, especially international and export cartels, affected trade and international political
relations. Some international raw material cartels appear to have connections to colonial economies
and may influence their international trade patterns. Colonial trade patterns have a high degree of
persistency (Battarcherja, 2004a). Their role in changing countries’ terms of trade has also been con-
sidered significant (LeClaire, 2000). In the international business history literature, the role of multi-
nationals and their position in colonial markets has been the focus of extensive research. The legacy
of international cartels, especially in rawmaterials has to date, received far less attention.2 We suggest
2See e.g. Fitzgerald (2015, pp. 228–229), for connections between changing trade patterns and cartels in the interwar period.
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that overall, international cartels have played a large role in the development of trade patterns over
time, but that this broader perspective has been neglected in favour of studies of their influence in
specific markets. Nonetheless, the distorting effects from international combines were often a core
issue in international trade negotiations and trade agreements. The international and global impact
from these combines has been one factor behind the persistent idea of a global competition policy
(Gerber, 2010; Scherer, 1994).
Export cartels have been more the rule than the exception, but they have received little attention
in historical cartel studies (Bhattacharjea, 2004b). They were used by both large nations (such as the
US through the well-known Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918) and by much smaller countries. In the
Scandinavian countries, export cartels were prominent. Researchers have tended to see the cartel
strategy as a ‘necessity’ for small countries in the early phases of industrialisation. Such small
countries, it was argued, could not affect world product prices or otherwise distort the market.
They often, however, confronted large international or national cartels, which could ‘crush’ them
unless they organised collectively (Jensen-Eriksen, 2013; Schröter, 2012). The argument for export
cartels has parallels with that for the protection of infant industries and for small countries on the
verge of industrialisation; they are a way to compete on world markets. Schröter (2012)
however, argues that Scandinavian firms in particular, were not always small players; their economic
size varied from industry to industry. It is clear that export cartels do have a negative effect on the
welfare of importing countries. Such issues are worthy of further research in their own right.
Also under-researched are the effects of cartels beyond their own product markets, and in the
markets of related goods and services. Considerable effort has been given to examining the dynamics
within a cartel (Harrington, 2006; Levenstein & Suslow, 2006; 2011) and the impact of a cartel on
prices or market share (Bolotova, Connor, & Miller, 2008). Far less attention has been given to
their influence outside their own market or membership. Also underexamined are the transform-
ations that occur as cartels respond to their external environment and as they change that environ-
ment. While it is well known, for example, that mergers and acquisitions are one response to
increased regulatory pressure, less studied are the responses where cartels ‘push-back’ (via lobbying,
standard setting, or through international connections) to deflect regulatory pressure. Similarly,
while some studies examine cartels’ response to change, fewer examine their creation of change to
advance their own security and longevity. Nor have cartels’ first-mover advantage through technol-
ogy or innovation been studied much past the influence this gives to manipulate the market or prices,
when in fact, such advantage can mean locking in technology and standards for decades into the
future (Cantwell & Barrera, 1995).
We suggest that historical analysis offers the opportunity for a more nuanced study of the emer-
gence and reemergence of cartels and other forms of anti-competitive behaviour. The interplay of
economic, political and social forces and changes in the organisational or legal forms that are labelled
a cartel, imply that the ‘explanation’ for their rise and fall goes beyond mere economic factors. There
are numerous examples. For instance, simple economic factors are not always the main reason for a
cartel to occur in situations: where the state actively promotes cartels; or where the finance or insur-
ance sector ‘prefers’ to deal with cartelised industries; or where customers want the security of long-
term stability offered by reduced levels of competition, or where other (smaller) industry members
seek political or economic protection from larger cartelised firms. History demonstrates situations
(as occurred in Finland in the forestry sector) where the cartel members were reluctant participants
pressured by government and external influences to create a national cartel (Kuorelahti, 2018). In
other situations, acceptance into an international cartel is seen as demonstrating the quality of a
firm’s products and taken as a badge of honour (Hidvegi, 2015).
The historical record also highlights the variation in economic motivations behind cartels. While
profit maximisation is the motivation attributed to cartel members in the standard economic model,
in practice motivations can include maximising market share, protecting the status quo, reducing
uncertainty, minimising price or product disruptions or as a response to crisis. Cartel formation
can be assertive or defensive in impulse. Cartel disintegration can be caused by more than members’
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opportunism; external economic or political pressure; changes in the international status quo; loss of
support from other sectors in the economy may also trigger change. These issues were some of the
many raised by Harm Schröter in 2013, when he called for new investigations in cartel research. In
particular, he challenged researchers to address problems such as: why do some business organis-
ations prefer cartels over some other form? Why do cartels appear when and where they do?
What is this type of business growth model preferred over another? He too sought answers to ques-
tions like: what is the role of finance, or politics in cartel success? How important are particular indi-
viduals to cartels (both inside and outside the business organisation)? Is there a link between the level
of trust in an organisation (or society) and the tendency toward, or away from cartelisation? Are
there ‘varieties of cartels’ and are some of these related to cultural and national traits? These and
other questions broaden the research field and support the argument that cartels should be studied
in situ rather than removed and analysed ahistorically.
Beyond the product market – politics, trust and rhetoric.
The six papers in this special issue provide fascinating case studies that go beyond examining simple
markets, to take a broader perspective on the role of cartels in society and the international economy.
Each study, for example, reveals important (and differing) interactions between national government
authorities and the cartels in their jurisdictions. In some cases (as in Sandvik and Storli’s description
of Standard Oil) governments felt threatened by the coming of an international cartel. At the other
end of the spectrum, in twentieth century Spain, (Rosado-Cubero and Martínez-Soto) the sugar and
cement cartels worked hand-in-hand with the regime to deliver mutually beneficial outcomes. Espeli
too reveals how both the government and private companies found that the stability associated with
cartels working with government benefited both the private sector entity, the government and in the
specific case of insurance, the consumer. Karlsson, in contrast describes the fine tightrope walked by
the Swedish paper cartel, as its national arrangements with the Swedish authorities ran counter to the
European Community’s expectations and rules. Declercq’s depiction of the international copper car-
tel reveals how several governments found alignment between their domestic interests in stability,
employment and protection – but that these relationships changed over time. His work also
makes it clear that while the governments in the US and UK benefited from mutual cooperation
with the cartel, governments and citizens in several African countries were disadvantaged. Dahl-
ström, although not focusing on the direct relationship between government and cartels, reveals
how Nordic policy makers were responsive to the needs of the cement industry and its potential con-
tributions to exports.
While the link between governments and cartels is one element that extends beyond simple mar-
ket considerations, another is the issue of trust. Studies of cartel stability frequently reference trust
between the group members as a critical factor, but a further dimension is the role of trust outside the
group. For example, an important argument for the governmental support given to the Swedish life
and fire insurance cartels was the absolute need for consumers to trust in the stability and longevity
of insurance companies. Dahlström too argues that external trust was important for the formation of
the international cement cartel. It emerged in part, because it was founded in a society where per-
sonal and industry trust levels were high and that these external trust networks set the expectations
within the group.
Political positioning, and rhetorical argument may also affect the formation and behaviour of a
cartel. Karlsson’s close study of the discussions between the EEC and the existing Swedish paper
cartel reveals the importance of not taking the declared position of negotiators at face value. Her
work highlights the apparent contradiction between, for example, the UK paper producers’ weak
economic position and their expressed concern to ensure competitive markets (ie their main
motivation was to weaken the Swedish cartel, not to necessarily promote competition). From
the Swedish perspective, the cartel members viewed their profits as a function of natural and
competitive advantage and did not wish to lose their margins under the pressure of rhetorical
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argument. Declercq’s paper on the international impact of the copper cartel not only revealed its
links to government support, but from a wider perspective, how developed countries used private
sector organisations to their own advantage; and at the cost of inhibiting development in poorer
African countries.
Apart from these overlapping aspects of government-cartel relations, the importance of trust, and
the influence of political rhetoric, the specific focus of each individual paper reveals other aspects that
extend beyond the simple market analysis of the international cartel.
Case studies that extend beyond the market
The paper by Robrecht Declercq describes how international copper cartels simultaneously
influenced employment and resource security in several countries both positively and negatively,
while always protecting their own interests. Created to control prices and prevent disruption from
new entrants, US and European governments initially welcomed or at least, tolerated the Copper
Exporters Inc (CEI) cartel and International Copper Cartel (ICC). The actions of these organisations
enhanced domestic employment and social stability in the US and European economies, prior to the
early 1930s. They also offset the need for protectionist policies to safeguard local firms.3 Over time,
however, the cartels took advantage of the national governments’ forbearance, and behaved with less
restraint. For US and European producers a major benefit of the international cartels’ quota system
was that it enabled them a degree of protection that was only achieved later through direct political
intervention and protectionist legislation. By contrast, the cartels operated against the interests of
African nations as cartel agreements cut output, which meant export earnings and employment
were below the levels these countries’ governments were seeking. The cartel also shaped how copper
was brought to market, by disrupting the vertical supply chains sought by US companies and insti-
tuting a more horizontal (and competitive) supply system. Finally, the cartels also influenced
national perceptions of resource security (their access to copper) and arguably shaped strategic pol-
icies towards stockpiling ‘scarce’ resources.
Malin Dahlström’ s case study of the Nordic cement cartels reveals the close link between a coop-
erative culture and the evolution of this social attitude into more formal business arrangements.
Starting with close personal connections between directors, her research reveals how the forms of
cooperation changed, sometimes becoming institutionalised in an unintended form. A strong incli-
nation to cooperate, however, meant that in times of economic or planning crisis, so-called ‘compe-
titors’might assist each other, even across national boundaries. Unlike national cartels in some other
industries, cement exports were an important area of co-operation. This Nordic regional collabor-
ation was influential beyond its original national participants. The cement industry is infamous
for its tendency to become concentrated.4 It would seem clear that a major influence of the establish-
ment of European cement cartel, Cembureau in 1947, was the cooperation and trust that had devel-
oped at the Nordic level in the preceding four decades.
In contrast to the development of this internationally broad cartel, Ana Rosado-Cubero and
Angel Martínez-Soto relate the close links between Spain’s economic isolation under Franco and
the mutual inter-dependence that developed between the government and industry. Using both
the sugar and cement industries as her case studies, the long-standing Spanish cartels in these
two sectors, although differing in form, were both intimately linked to government policies of dom-
estic economic self-reliance. The General Association of Sugar Manufacturers (Sociedad General
Azucarera, SGA), while not including all the sugar producers within Spain, dominated the market
under a tariff umbrella and prices set in conjunction with government. The more cohesive cement
cartel was dominated by six large producers who shared production, attended to the regime’s build-
ing requirements and benefited from price and production controls that ensured their longevity. The
3For an estimate of the cartels’ net positive contribution to national welfare, see Guzman (2018);
4Fear (2008); For the case of the Swedish domestic situation in more detail, see Dahlström (2015)
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full cost of both cartels on the Spanish economy has not been fully estimated, but the distortions to
other sectors has taken years to overcome. These examples also reveal the potential long-ranging
effects cartels can have on the markets beyond the common questions of higher prices and monopoly
profits.
Harald Espeli’s paper on Norwegian cartels in life insurance and fire insurance clearly shows why
motivations other than simple profit maximisation may lead to cartel formation. In both cases, the
government and industry understood the need to guarantee the long-term viability of the insurance
companies and thus ensure customers received their entitlements irrespective of the time elapsed
between paying their premium and the event insured against. Around the world cartels cooperating
to set premiums and policy terms are relatively common in these sectors but are still relatively under-
researched.5 Even less examined was the almost symbiotic relationship between insurance regu-
lations and the needs of the industry; to the point where differentiating the interests of the industry
from the legislative arrangements that ‘controlled’ it was difficult. The events described in the paper
provide a prime example of regulatory capture. Even when state interests finally diverged from those
of the cartel, the ‘collapse’ of the cartel was in reality just a change in form; from a cartel to a merged
entity.
Birgit Karlssons’ research into the ‘clash of ideas’ between the EEC and Sweden regarding paper
cartels is revealing. She clearly demonstrates that the purported difference between total prohibition
of cartels verses constraining cartels only when they abused their market power, was not as great as
might appear at first glance. While the Swedish attitude towards cartels was more tolerant – as they
argued price stability and certainty helped maximise social welfare – their market dominance also
meant that the EEC’s belief that fierce competition maximised total welfare was not well-founded
in market reality. Politically, however, the Swedes were at a disadvantage. When the two approaches
clashed, the final compromise, was a testament to both astute negotiating and the need for paper
products to be supplied to industries at consistent and predictable prices. Ultimately, the application
of an extreme competitive market solution was sidelined. Her paper provides detailed insights into
the negotiations that occurred between regulators and cartel members over several rounds of discus-
sion. The EC considered the Swedish producers had an ‘unfair’ advantage, due to their competitive
advantage of abundant forest resources and because the pulp producers had a monopoly position.
The results, they argued were excessively high prices. The Swedes rejected these arguments, believing
they were based, in part, on misunderstandings of the market situation and in part because they sus-
pected that EEC wanted access to Swedish raw materials, and paper. The Swedes emphasised that
their national industry was simply more competitive and efficient than others and that collaboration
in Scandinavia had improved product development and productivity. The EEC could allow exemp-
tions for cartels if collaborations were considered beneficial overall; but only then. For the EEC, its
internal market was the focus of attention, while in the Swedish case their emphasis was on global
free trade. An agreement was reached, and a temporary tariff imposed on Swedish products, which
was gradually removed. Over time the Swedish Government and industry adapted to EEC
regulations.
Päl Sandvik’s and Espen Storli’s paper outlines the influence of one of the world’s most well-
known monopolies (Standard Oil) on several Scandinavian markets. Their work highlights the vari-
ation in interactions that can occur between a private sector monopoly and the state, depending on
the attitudes and actions of the national government. They compare the three markets in Denmark,
Sweden and Norway, and Standard Oil’s strategies in each. They find the company used its Danish
subsidiary in all three markets to reach agreements and gain market dominance. The article high-
lights the changing approaches that Standard Oil adopted and in particular, how it changed when
other firms entered the market. During and after WWI the governments’ approaches also changed.
Initially Standard Oil used aggressive takeover and pricing policies to keep others out; a tactic it also
used in other European countries. As competition slowly increased in the interwar period, Standard
5For exceptions, see Borscheid & Haueter (2012)
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Oil became more predisposed to engaging in collaborative agreements with others. Different
approaches by each national government appear to have influenced the average price and level of
competition in each nation’s fuel market. The Danish authorities, for example, followed a reasonably
laissez-faire approach, while the Swedes and Norwegians were more interventionist. Sandvik and
Storli’s paper reveals a multitude of strategies one monopoly used to gain market power and how
these changed in the face of changing market conditions and government policies.
Conclusions
What are the lessons to be learned from these historical examples? The first must be, that our con-
cern with, and analysis of, cartels must go beyond the studies of internal stability and product and
market manipulation that are the focus of much cartel research. These things are important, but they
only explain part of the phenomenon that is cartels. The factors that influence how and why cartels
form, their ability to influence market outcomes, their persistence and acceptance, and their impact
in the community go well beyond issues of price, quantity and internal coherence. Case studies such
as these demonstrate that, on occasions, cartels have used and are themselves used by governments
to further political as well as economic interests, sometimes with the cost being the prioritising one
nation’s citizens ahead of another.
Cartels as institutional forms embody different dimensions of trust; ranging from trust
between the members to the social compacts made with consumers and groups in other nations.
The historical record also demonstrates that care must be taken in assessing the behaviour and
motivation of cartels. There are often multiple (sometime conflicting) reasons for cartels to be
established, supported or opposed; many of these are not well explained by simple economic
models.
Perhaps the most important reason for the historical study of cartels is that this can also illu-
minate the present. In a recent Special Issue ‘New Perspectives in Regulatory History’ in the jour-
nal Business History Review in 2019, a series of articles discussed how attitudes to the regulation
of market behaviour have changed over time. This sentiment is echoed here, particularly when it
is recalled that government policies against anti-competitive behaviour and their actions against
cartels and trusts are only part of a broader range of regulation. Today’s debate on the apparent
shortcomings and limitations of competition policy and anti-trust legislation has much to learn
from historical investigations. This is particularly illustrated in the BHR paper by Crane (2019)
examining contemporary US debates on the weakness of their antitrust legislation. He argues that
the current narrow focus on consumer welfare and strict technical reasoning (attributed to the
influence of the Chicago school) rather than a broader focus on the problems of market concen-
tration (which dominated the earlier antitrust movement) explains a significant part of the weak-
ening of contemporary antitrust policies, particularly in the US. Similarly, the apparent
dichotomy between the lawyers’ rules-based approach versus the economists’ effect-based reason-
ing is not one of opposites, but rather a matter of degree, albeit with varying emphasis in differ-
ent periods. In most countries antitrust/competition polices in practice have been the outcome of
deliberations between the arguments of various levels of governance (administrators, courts and
politicians) and business and consumer interests. To understand the shifts in balance, historical
insight plays a critical role. By revealing the shifts in position over time, the swings and round-
abouts of political success, or the importance of singular events or technological change, and the
nuances of argument, detailed historical investigations are invaluable – even indispensable. Not
only do they improve present debates on the optimum equilibrium between market competition,
and market power, they can help us avoid the mistakes of the past.
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